Provenance
Prove what your agent knew at the moment it acted, to someone who was not there and has no reason to take your word for it.
Not built as a product. The raw material exists: every delivery and every refusal already writes a trace, and you can read your own at any time for free. What is missing is the part that makes a trace mean something to a third party.
A trace answers the question for you. Provenance is the same question asked by someone else, months later, who was not in the room: what did this agent actually know when it made that decision, and how would I know if the record had been edited since.
Those are different problems. The first needs a good log. The second needs a commitment made at the time, verifiable without asking the party who benefits from the answer.
What already holds
Every call, delivered or refused, writes a record of the sources considered, what each one scored, which attempts ran, the checks that passed, the level that came out and why. Where an answer was anchored, the reference, its value, its round timestamp and the tolerances applied are all in there, along with whether that reference was independent of the source it agreed with.
Metera also distinguishes a number the source measured from one we derived by counting something it returned. That distinction, origin, rides on every answer, because a derived number and a measured one are different kinds of claim and only one has a provider standing behind it.
Traces are readable only by the account that made the call, and an id belonging to someone else is indistinguishable from an id that never existed.
What is missing
A record you hold is evidence to you and an assertion to everyone else. Making it evidence to a third party needs three things we do not have yet: a commitment written at delivery time rather than reconstructed later, a way to verify one without querying us, and a scheme that does not put a caller's data on a public ledger in the process.
That last constraint is the one that makes this genuinely hard. The obvious design publishes a hash of the trace. The obvious design also leaks the shape of what an agent was asking about, and often that is the sensitive part rather than the value itself.
Where it would matter
Wherever an agent's decision has to survive review. A treasury operation executed at a price someone later disputes. A risk check that passed before a transaction that failed. An audit asking not whether the agent was right but whether it was reckless, which is a question about what it knew and at what level of confidence.
Until that exists, this page says so. Claiming provenance while shipping a private log would be exactly the kind of overstatement the rest of this product is built to prevent, and we would deserve to be measured by it.